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CRIMINAL LAW
Marla GraffDecker *
Stephen R. McCullough **

I.

INTRODUCTION

This article summarizes selected published decisions of the Supreme Court of Virginia, Virginia cases reviewed by the Supreme
Court of the United States, and decisions of the Court of Appeals
of Virginia issued between July 1, 2002 and July 1, 2003. The article also includes a summary of a few of the most relevant
changes to the criminal law enacted during that time by the General Assembly of Virginia. The sheer quantity of new cases and
statutes presents a significant challenge to the authors. We have
tried to select those most relevant to the practitioner; of necessity,
the discussion can highlight only a few of the most salient topographical changes to a complex landscape.

II. CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES

A. FourthAmendment
1. Standing and Reasonable Expectation of Privacy
Standing is frequently an overlooked component of a Fourth
Amendment challenge. While the term "standing," in the context
* Chief, Special Prosecutions Section, Attorney General's Office, Commonwealth of
Virginia. B.A., 1980, Gettysburg College; J.D., 1983, University of Richmond School of
Law.
** Assistant Attorney General, Criminal Litigation Section, Attorney General's Office,
Commonwealth of Virginia. B.A., 1994, University of Virginia, with high distinction; J.D.,
1997, University of Richmond School of Law, cum laude.
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of standing to raise a claim, is often used for simplicity, as the
cases demonstrate, courts characterize the challenge in a more
detailed manner, taking into account both whether there is a subjective reasonable expectation of privacy that society is willing to
recognize and whether the defendant actually exhibits an expectation of privacy in the object.1 In any event, Virginia appellate
courts reviewed three cases that are worthy of discussion on this
issue.
In Bell v. Commonwealth,2 the Supreme Court of Virginia considered numerous challenges to the defendant's conviction for
capital murder of a police officer and to his sentence of death.3
One claim involved the search of a vehicle that had been used by
the defendant, but owned by another.4 On the morning prior to
the murder, the defendant parked the vehicle in a lot outside an
apartment building and abandoned it. 5 The manager of the building reported the abandoned vehicle, and the police arranged to
have it towed to the police station.6 During the process, the police
learned that a finance company had a lien on the car and that it
had been stolen from an "Impound Lot."7
The lien holder gave the police permission to search the vehicle.' The defendant had possession of the car because he had borrowed it from the owner's girlfriend and failed to return it, despite her requests.9 The owner of the vehicle testified that he
never gave the defendant permission to use the car.1 ° The defendant moved to suppress three bullets found inside the car, claiming that the search was unlawful. The trial court ruled that the
defendant did not have standing to object to the search. 2 The
Supreme Court of Virginia found that the defendant failed to
meet his burden of proving that he had a legitimate expectation
of privacy in the vehicle in order to confer standing to challenge

1. Anderson v. Commonwealth, 25 Va. App. 565, 576, 490 S.E.2d 274, 279 (Ct. App.
1997), affd 256 Va. 580, 507 S.E.2d 339 (1998).
2. 264 Va. 172, 563 S.E.2d 695 (2002), cert. denied 123 S. Ct. 860 (2003).
3. Id. at 178, 183, 563 S.E.2d at 700-01, 703.
4. Id. at 189, 563 S.E.2d at 707-08.
5. Id. at 189, 563 S.E.2d at 707.
6. Id. at 189, 563 S.E.2d at 707-08.
7. Id. at 189, 563 S.E.2d at 708.
8. Id. at 189-90, 563 S.E.2d at 708.
9. Id. at 190, 563 S.E.2d at 708.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Id.
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the search. 13 The court pointed out that, in addition to the defendant not being the owner of the car, he failed to establish that he
was authorized to have it in his possession at the time of the
search.1 4 Indeed, he left it at an apartment where he was not a
tenant.'" Moreover, at the time of the search, a lien holder was in
the process of repossessing the vehicle and gave police consent to
search it. 6 Thus, for all of these reasons, the supreme court found
that the trial court properly concluded that the defendant lacked
standing to challenge the search.1 7
8 the Court of Appeals of VirIn McCracken v. Commonwealth,"
ginia, sitting en banc,-applying the principle that a trespasser
does not have a justifiable expectation of privacy in the home of
another-found that the defendant did not have standing to contest the sheriff department's entry into the home of his estranged
paramour. 9 The defendant lived with Theresa Fields ("Fields") in
her home for about three years prior to the incident.2" On the day
the sheriffs deputies entered Fields's home, she called the 911
emergency dispatcher twice." The first time, she reported that
she wanted the defendant removed from her home.22 Deputies arrived at the residence and found the defendant arguing with
Fields.23 The defendant agreed to move out of the house and the
deputies remained to assist him in removing his belongings.24 The
defendant left to go to his mother's home.2 5 Later, after an argument with the defendant over the telephone, Fields again telephoned the 911 emergency dispatcher and reported that she believed the defendant was returning to her home.26 The same two
deputies were dispatched back to Fields's residence. When they
arrived, neighbors alerted the deputies to the dispute inside.2"

13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.

Id.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
39
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

Va. App. 254, 572 S.E.2d 493 (Ct. App. 2002).
at 260, 572 S.E.2d at 496.
at 258, 572 S.E.2d at 495.
at 258-59, 572 S.E.2d at 495.
at 258, 572 S.E.2d at 495.

at 259, 572 S.E.2d at 495.
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The officers heard the defendant and Fields arguing inside the
house.29 The back door was locked. 3' The front door was partially
open, but the screen door was closed.3 One of the deputies "drew
his weapon, pushed open the screen door, and entered" the residence.32 The defendant challenged the police entry and the subsequent search of his person-which he resisted.3 3
The court of appeals found that the police had probable cause
to believe that the defendant was trespassing before the officer
opened the screen door.3 4 However, the court also found that because the defendant was a trespasser, he had no reasonable expectation of privacy in the residence and, consequently, had no
standing to challenge the entry.35
In the context of a very unique set of circumstances in Sheler v.
Commonwealth,3 6 the court of appeals considered whether the
trial court erred when it refused to suppress glass fragments
found on the defendant's shoes and clothing.37 The court of appeals held that while the seizure of the defendant's person was
lawful, the police unlawfully searched the defendant's shoes and
the evidence should have been suppressed.3 8 The court was presented with an issue of first impression in Virginia-whether an
individual has a reasonable expectation of privacy in the sole of
his shoe. The court of appeals, contrary to the ruling of the trial
court, found that the defendant had both an objective and subjective expectation of privacy in his shoes.40 First, the court found
that "an individual's expectation of privacy in his or her shoes is
an interest that society is willing to accept as reasonable."4 ' The
court opined that, much like with the garments one wears, an individual does not expect another to "manipulate" and "explore"
areas of his or her shoes that are not readily exposed to public

29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 258, 572 S.E.2d at 495.
Id. at 260, 572 S.E.2d at 496.
Id.
38 Va. App. 465, 566 S.E.2d 203 (Ct. App. 2002).
Id. at 468, 566 S.E.2d at 204.
Id. at 471, 566 S.E.2d at 206.
Id. at 475, 566 S.E.2d at 207-08.
Id. at 477, 566 S.E.2d at 208-09.
Id. at 477, 566 S.E.2d at 208.
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view.42 Second, the court found that, in this case, the defendant
had not exposed the soles of his shoes to the detective before the
detective asked to see the shoes. 3 Consequently, the defendant
also "exhibited a subjective expectation that the soles of his shoes
remain[ed] free from close inspection."44
2. Exceptions to the Warrant Requirement
a. Consensual Encounters and Consent
A consensual encounter between a citizen and a police officer
does not constitute a seizure for purposes of the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution. 5 The Supreme Court of
Virginia reviewed two significant cases relating to the consensual
nature of an encounter.
In Dickerson v. Commonwealth,46 the court considered whether
an encounter after completion of a traffic stop constituted a consensual encounter or a second seizure.47 This is the same type of
analysis the court was asked to conduct in Reittinger v. Commonwealth,4" where under a very different set of circumstances,
the court found that a second seizure had, in fact, occurred. 9 In
Dickerson, a police officer received a radio dispatch that a particular vehicle with a particular license plate number had failed to
yield the right of way to an ambulance. ° The officer saw the vehicle traveling sixty-five miles-per-hour in a fifty-five miles-perhour zone.51 He activated his emergency lights and siren and
stopped the speeding car.52 The defendant was the driver of the

42. Id. at 477, 566 S.E.2d at 208-09.
43. Id. at 477, 566 S.E.2d at 209.
44. Id.
45. See, e.g., United States v. Drayton, 536 U.S. 194, 200-01 (2002) (stating that the
police do not contravene the Fourth Amendment "merely by approaching individuals on
the street or in other public places and putting questions to them if they are willing to listen .... If a reasonable person would feel free to terminate the encounter, then he or she
has not been seized.").
46. 266 Va. 14, 581 S.E.2d 195 (2003).
47. Id. at 16, 581 S.E.2d at 196.
48. 260 Va. 232, 532 S.E.2d 25 (2000).
49. Id. at 237, 532 S.E.2d at 28.
50. Dickerson, 266 Va. at 16, 581 S.E.2d at 196.
51. Id.
52. Id.
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vehicle.53 The officer noticed an odor of alcohol about the defendant's person and asked him to get out of the car.54 The officer
then conducted field sobriety tests. After the tests, the officer
decided not to arrest the defendant for any alcohol related offenses.56 The officer told the defendant that "he was free to go but
that he might be subpoenaed later for the failure-to-yield traffic
infraction."57
The defendant returned to his car, opened the driver's door,
and started to get back into the car. 5 The officer asked him, "'if
there was anything in the car [he] should know about, dope, mari59
juana, roaches in the ashtray, something, anything like that.'
Dickerson responded, "no.' 60 The officer asked him if he smoked
marijuana.6 ' The defendant said that he did, "but not while he
was driving."62 Dickerson told the officer that there was some
marijuana in the ashtray. The officer asked the defendant if he
could search the car.64 Dickerson refused to permit the search, but
removed the ashtray from the car's console and handed it to the
officer.6 5 The ashtray contained "'numerous hand-rolled cigarette
roaches"' which the defendant spontaneously identified as marijuana cigarettes.66 The officer asked a second time for permission
to search the car.6" Dickerson again refused, but the officer told
him to step away from the vehicle and then began to search it.6" A
quantity of cocaine and two sets of scales were found in the car.69
The officer arrested the defendant, who was later charged with
possession of cocaine with intent to distribute.7 ° The trial court
denied Dickerson's motion to suppress the evidence and

53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. (alteration in original).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 17, 581 S.E.2d at 196.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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Dickerson was convicted of the offense.7 1 The court of appeals affirmed the conviction, finding no Fourth Amendment violation.72
The supreme court agreed and found that, based on the totality
of the circumstances, a reasonable person would have believed
that the traffic stop had ended and that he was free to leave at
the time of the questions by the officer.73 The court reasoned that
not only had the officer told the defendant that he was free to go,
but also that the defendant had returned to his car and had begun to get inside, demonstrating his knowledge that the traffic
stop was over.74 Further, the officer's "questions sought information and did not implicate restraint or the need to restrain" the
defendant." Dickerson responded to the questions by freely stating that he used marijuana and actually showing the officer what
he admitted were remnants of marijuana cigarettes in the ashtray.76 The court rejected the defendant's argument that the facts
supported a seizure, recognizing that, despite the presence of two
armed officers, the officers did not block the defendant's access to
his car, nor did they prevent him from leaving after the traffic
stop.7 7 Citing the recent decision by the Supreme Court of the
United States in United States v. Drayton,7" the Supreme Court of
Virginia noted that the mere presence of uniformed, armed officers does not transform an otherwise consensual encounter into a
seizure." The court concluded that the encounter following the
traffic stop was consensual and the evidence was lawfully admitted at trial.8 0
In another case, decided the same day as Dickerson, the Supreme Court of Virginia reached a very different result. In Harris
1 the court found that a seizure that continued
v. Commonwealth,"
after the basis for a legitimate traffic stop had expired was
unlawful.8 2 In this case, an officer initiated a traffic stop for a broken license plate light that he observed on a truck driven by the
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.

Id. at 17, 581 S.E.2d at 196-97.
Id. at 17, 581 S.E.2d at 197.
Id. at 17-18, 581 S.E.2d at 197.
Id. at 18, 581 S.E.2d at 197.
Id.
Id.
Id.
536 U.S. 194 (2002).
Dickerson, 266 Va. at 18, 581 S.E.2d at 197.
Id. at 19, 581 S.E.2d at 198.
266 Va. 28, 581 S.E.2d 206 (2003).
Id. at 33, 581 S.E.2d at 210.
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defendant.8 3 The officer stopped the truck occupied by the defendant and a passenger.8 4 A second officer arrived and both marked
police vehicles remained on the scene with their emergency lights
activated. 5 The officer who initiated the stop asked Harris for his
license and vehicle registration. 6 The defendant produced his social security card and told the officer that he knew he had been
stopped because he had no license plate light.8 7 The officer told
the defendant to get out of the truck and asked the defendant
questions to confirm his identity. 8 Using his hand-held radio, the
officer then provided his dispatcher with the social security number.8 9 The dispatcher advised the officer of Harris's identity and
that he had a valid Virginia driver's license.9 ° The police officer
returned the defendant's social security card and did not issue a
summons;9 ' however, he asked Harris if he had anything illegal
in the truck or on his person.92 The defendant stated that he did
not.9 3 The officer then asked if he could search the truck.94 The defendant consented to the search.9" The officer ultimately found
stolen property inside the vehicle.9 6 At no time prior to the search
did the police tell Harris or the passenger that they were free to
leave, nor did the officer ever tell the defendant that he was not
going to be issued a summons for the traffic offense.
The supreme court found that the reasonable articulable suspicion to support the traffic stop ended when the officer returned
the social security card to the defendant, and the traffic stop was
over.98 Thus, in order to have been lawful, the continuation of the
encounter would have had to have been consensual.9 9 The supreme court, disagreeing with the court of appeals and the trial

83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.

Id. at 30, 581 S.E.2d at 208.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 31, 581 S.E.2d at 208.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 33, 581 S.E.2d at 210.
Id.
Id.
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court, found that it was not.' ° Under the circumstances of the
case, the supreme court found it significant that, when the officer
returned the social security card to the defendant, he did not tell
the defendant that he was not going to issue a summons, nor did
he tell the defendant that he was free to leave. 10 ' Instead, the officer immediately began to ask questions and asked for permission
to search the truck. 0 2 The court noted that the defendant knew
he had committed a traffic offense and was aware that he did not
provide the officer with a license and registration when asked to
do so.' 0 ' The officer did nothing to indicate that the defendant was
no longer being detained for a traffic violation when he began
asking questions.' 4 Instead, the court noted, the defendant remained in the presence of two armed, uniformed officers and two
police vehicles with emergency lights flashing.'0 ' Under these circumstances, the court found that no reasonable person would
have felt free to leave or free to refuse to answer the officer's
questions.10 6 Consequently, the encounter was not consensual, but
was a seizure that was not supported by independent reasonable
suspicion or probable cause.' The court further held that the defendant's consent to the search was the product of an illegal seizure and was not the result of "an independent act of free will."'0°
Thus, the consent was involuntary and the evidence should have
been suppressed.' 9
The Court of Appeals of Virginia has also decided several consensual encounter cases this year. Inasmuch as Fourth Amendment analysis-including whether the protection applies at allis extremely dependent on the facts of the case, this is a highly
litigated issue resulting in many published and unpublished decisions.
One case that is worthy of discussion is Barkley v. Commonwealth.' ° This case involves what is commonly referred to as a

100. Id.
101. Id.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
39

at 31, 581 S.E.2d at 208.
at 33, 581 S.E.2d at 210.

at 34, 581 S.E.2d at 210.
at 34, 581 S.E.2d at 210-11.
Va. App. 682, 576 S.E.2d 234 (Ct. App. 2003).
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"knock and talk."11 ' It also involves a consensual encounter that
begins on a porch and extends into a residence." 2 In Barkley, two
police officers, one in uniform and the other in plain clothes, went
to a residence to investigate a "'Crime Stoppers' tip."" 3 Specifically, the information provided in the tip was "that male and female juveniles ... were using and selling marijuana and cocaine"

at that apartment." 4 An officer knocked on the apartment door
and the male defendant answered." 5 The male defendant went
out onto the porch with the police and asked how he could help
them." 6 One of the officers told the defendant that they were
there to "'investigate a complaint on the residence ... the building itself or the home itself.""' 7 The officer explained that the defendant was not under arrest but that the police had received a
tip that there was possible illegal activity going on at the residence-particularly involving the sale and use of illegal narcotics."' In an abundance of caution, the officer then advised the defendant of his Miranda"9 rights. 2 ° Barkley acknowledged that he
understood his rights and admitted that he smoked marijuana,
but claimed that no one sold drugs from the residence.' 2 '
While the defendant spoke with the police on the porch, several
individuals passed by the apartment.'22 The defendant told the
police that the neighbors were "nosey-'' 123 In response, one of the
officers suggested that they all go inside the apartment. 24
Barkley led the officers inside to his bedroom, which was also
used as a den.'25 The primary officer continued to explain the
purpose of their presence and again asked the defendant if he

111. See, e.g., Rogers v. Pendleton, 249 F.3d 279, 289 (4th Cir. 2001) (defining the right
to "knock and talk" as the right "to knock on a residence's door or otherwise approach the
residence seeking to speak to the inhabitants").
112. Barkley, 39 Va. App. at 688, 576 S.E.2d at 237.
113. Id. at 687-88, 576 S.E.2d at 236-237.
114. Id. at 687-88, 576 S.E.2d at 237.
115. Id. at 688, 576 S.E.2d at 237.
116. Id.
117. Id. (alteration in original).
118. Id.
119. The Supreme Court of the United States first identified a suspect's rights during
police questioning in the case of Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
120. Barkley, 39 Va. App. at 688, 576 S.E.2d at 237.
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Id.

2003]

CRIMINAL LAW

was aware of any illegal activity in the residence. 1 26 During the
conversation, both officers noticed the remains of a marijuana
cigarette in an ashtray. 127 They brought the marijuana to
Barkley's attention and again advised him of his Miranda
rights. 2 ' The defendant reiterated that he occasionally smoked
129
marijuana and removed a bag of marijuana from his dresser.
The officer asked if he could search the apartment. 130 In response,
the defendant asked if he was required to permit a search.' 3 ' The
officer explained that the defendant could refuse to provide his
permission, but that based upon observations by the officers, they
could obtain a search warrant for the premises.'3 2 The defendant
reluctantly gave his permission, suggesting that they would
probably search the apartment regardless of what he said.'33 The
officer explained a second time that Barkley could refuse to allow
the search and no search would be conducted without his consent
or a warrant. 134 The defendant provided his consent, yet the officer continued to ask questions to ensure that the consent was
voluntary. 135 Ultimately, the police went forward with a search
based on the36 defendant's consent and discovered over a pound of
marijuana.

1

The court of appeals found that the conduct of the officers did
not convert the otherwise consensual encounter into a seizure."'
Contrary to the defendant's claim, the court found that the officers did not identify the defendant as the target of a criminal investigation, but instead told him that they were investigating
complaints about illegal activities at that residence. 3 ' The court
noted that the explanation of the officers' presence, combined
with the fact that they informed him that he was not under arrest, would lead a reasonable person to believe that he was not

126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 688-89, 576 S.E.2d at 237.
Id. at 689, 576 S.E.2d at 237.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 693, 576 S.E.2d at 239.
Id.
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being detained.'39 Further, the court found that under the totality
of the circumstances, the officers' conduct did not suggest a
"'threatening presence' so as to create a seizure. 4 ° The officers
did not display their weapons and the atmosphere remained casual throughout the encounter.' 4 ' The tone of the interview was
relaxed and non-accusatory.'
The court of appeals rejected the
defendant's argument that when the police advised him of his
Miranda rights, the encounter turned into a seizure."' The court
noted that the record shows that the officers advised the defendant of his rights merely as a matter of caution.'" Thus, the court
concluded that the defendant voluntarily consented to the police
entering his residence. 4 ' Likewise, the court found that he consented to a search of his apartment during a continued consensual encounter with the police. 4 '
Consent to search is another similar area of analysis that cannot be overlooked when dealing with the Fourth Amendment. Often times, consent to search goes hand-in-hand with a consensual
encounter. However, an individual may also voluntarily consent
to a search during a seizure.'4 7 In short, consent is frequently an
issue raised in connection with a Fourth Amendment challenge to
a conviction.
One recent decision by the Court of Appeals of Virginia relating
to consent is significant. In Edwards v. Commonwealth, 48 the
court of appeals analyzed the scope of a defendant's consent to a
search of his "person."'4 9 The police knew through an informant
that two individuals, one of whom was known as "E," were selling
narcotics from a particular room in a specific Econo Lodge.'
When the police arrived at the room, the defendant was not pre-

139. Id.
140. Id.
141. Id. at 694, 576 S.E.2d at 240.
142. Id. at 695, 576 S.E.2d at 240.
143. Id. at 694, 576 S.E.2d at 240.
144. Id. at 695, 576 S.E.2d at 240.
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. See, e.g., Davis v. United States, 328 U.S. 582, 593-94 (1946) (analyzing all of the
circumstances and determining that a filling station operator acted consensually when he
unlocked a door where agents found contraband).
148. 38 Va. App. 823, 568 S.E.2d 454 (Ct. App. 2002).
149. Id. at 828, 568 S.E.2d at 457.
150. Id. at 826, 568 S.E.2d at 456.
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sent and an occupant gave the officer permission to search.1 5' The
defendant knocked on the door and entered the room where the
police were conducting the search for illegal drugs.1 52 He identified himself as "E."'58 One of the officers told the defendant that
he understood that the defendant was a supplier of cocaine to a
variety of locations, including locations at that motel.'5 4 The officer then asked him for consent to search his person.'55 At the
time, Edwards was holding a clear plastic bag of women's white
tube socks.'5 6 He agreed to the search, stating '"[s]ure, no problem."'15 7 He then put the bag of socks down on a nearby bed and
cooperated with the search.' 8 The officer searched the defendant
but did not find narcotics.' 59 The officer then picked up the bag of
socks from the bed, asked the defendant what he was doing with
a bag of women's socks, and immediately noticed a lumpy object
in the bag. 6 ° He looked inside the bag and found two plastic
sandwich bags containing cocaine.' 6 '
The question before the court of appeals, a matter of first impression in Virginia, was whether the defendant's consent to a
search of his "person" extended to the bag he was holding when
he provided his voluntary consent. 62 The court found "that the
scope of consent to search one's person encompasses such
items." 63 It noted that at the time Edwards agreed to the search,
"the bag [of socks] was 'appended to,' or intimately connected
with, his person." 64 Also, the defendant knew that "the object of
the search was evidence related to cocaine distribution, which
could possibly be found within the bag." 65 Finally, the court addressed Edwards' placement of the bag on the bed after he consented to the search.' 66 It stated that Edwards' "passive acquies-

151.
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.

See id.; see also id. at 839, 568 S.E.2d at 462 (Elder, J., dissenting).
Id. at 826, 568 S.E.2d at 456.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. (alteration in original).
Id.
Id.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at 828,
at 829,
at 830,
at 830,

568
568
568
568

S.E.2d
S.E.2d
S.E.2d
S.E.2d

at
at
at
at

457.
457.
457.
458.
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cence while the officer searched the bag affirmed that the bag was
within the scope of his consent."16 7 Based upon all of the circumstances, the court found that a reasonable officer would believe
to search his person included conthat the defendant's consent
1 68
bag.
the
search
sent to
b. Inventory Search
In King v. Commonwealth,6 9 the Court of Appeals of Virginia
determined whether the police lawfully impounded the defendant's vehicle and, if so, whether the warrantless search of that
vehicle was authorized as an inventory search. 7 ° Applying an objective standard, the court found that the facts did not support
the conclusion that the impoundment of the defendant's vehicle
was intended to prevent a public safety risk or to safeguard the
vehicle-the two bases for impoundment.' 7 ' The court noted that
the car was properly parked and did not obstruct the flow of traffic. "7' 2 Nor was it trespassing on private property or violating any
parking ordinances.71 3 The record demonstrated that the police
failed to inquire as to the defendant's ability to make arrangements for the car to be moved.' 74 Moreover, there was no evidence
that the defendant had property inside the car that would have
been subject to vandalism. 7 ' Finally, the defendant was not being
arrested, unlike other situations where a vehicle is impounded.'7 6
Based on these facts, the court of appeals found that the impoundment was an unlawful seizure and did not fall within the
"community caretaker" exception to the warrant requirement.'7 7

167.
168.
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.

Id.
Id.
39
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at 831, 568 S.E.2d at 458.
Va. App. 306, 572 S.E.2d 518 (Ct. App. 2002).
at 311, 572 S.E.2d at 520.
at 311-12, 572 S.E.2d at 521.
at 312, 572 S.E.2d at 521.

at 310-14, 572 S.E.2d at 520-22.
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3. Reasonable Suspicion
A major consideration in Fourth Amendment analysis relating
to stops and seizures is whether the police officer possessed a
"reasonable, articulable suspicion" of criminal activity, so as to
justify a stop or seizure. 178 A few cases decided this past year are
worth noting in this area.
In Whitfield v. Commonwealth,'7 9 the Supreme Court of Virginia found that the police had reasonable suspicion to believe
that the defendant might be engaged in criminal activity when
they stopped him.8 ° At 3:30 a.m., in a high crime area, the defendant appeared to be trespassing on private property near an
abandoned building.' When the initial officer shined the police
car's floodlight in the direction of the defendant, the defendant
ran.8l 2 The defendant continued to run away as a second officer
arrived and joined the pursuit.8 3 The defendant was ultimately
caught when he could not escape over a high fence.8 4 Relying, in
part, on the Supreme Court of the United States' decision in Illi8 the Supreme Court of Virginia concluded that
nois v. Wardlow,"'
the "characteristics of the area" in conjunction with the defendant's behavior when the police arrived, which "includ[ed] his
unprovoked flight, justified the stop, and further [police] investigation."'8 6
In Alston v. Commonwealth,"7 the police had reasonable articulable suspicion to believe that the passenger of a vehicle had
committed a crime. 8 8 While following the car, police noticed that
the driver negotiated the vehicle in an evasive manner, then
stopped the vehicle, and abruptly exited the car.8 9 The Court of
Appeals of Virginia held that under these circumstances, the po-

178. See, e.g., United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 702 (1983) (applying the concept
first addressed in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 24-25 (1968)).
179. 265 Va. 358, 576 S.E.2d 463 (2003).
180. Id. at 361-62, 576 S.E.2d at 465.
181. Id. at 362, 576 S.E.2d at 465.
182. Id.
183. Id.
184. Id.
185. 528 U.S. 119 (2000).
186. Whitfield, 265 Va. at 362, 576 S.E.2d at 465.
187. 40 Va. App. 728, 581 S.E.2d 245 (Ct. App. 2003).
188. Id. at 733-34, 581 S.E.2d at 248.
189. Id. at 740, 581 S.E.2d at 251.
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lice can order the driver
back into the vehicle for the duration of
190
the investigatory stop.

4. Probable Cause and Searches Incident to Arrest
In Slayton v. Commonwealth, 9 ' the Court of Appeals of Virginia reiterated the well-established standard for probable
cause.192 It also made clear that "even though probable cause [requires] more than a 'mere suspicion [of criminal activity],' it is not
necessary for the facts to be 'sufficient to convict' the accused of
the offense."' 93 The court further noted that as long as the officer
has objective probable cause to arrest the defendant for one offense at the time of the search, it is legally9 irrelevant
that he ul4
timately arrests him for a different offense.
5. Scope of Search
In Murphy v. Commonwealth, 9 ' the Supreme Court of Virginia
had an opportunity to determine the scope of the decision of the
Supreme Court of the United States in Minnesota v. Dickerson.'96
In Murphy, the police executed a search warrant at a residence
where the defendant was present. 97 The warrant authorized a
search of the residence for guns, drugs, and related items. 9 ' It
also authorized police to search a named person, who was not the
defendant.'99 When the police entered the house, they ordered the
defendant to lie down on the floor.200 They handcuffed the defendant and frisked him for weapons.2 1 During the frisk for weapons, the officer "felt a bulge in the left front pocket of [the defen20 2
dant's] pants, and sensed that the object was a 'plastic baggy.'
190.
191.
192.
193.
2002)).
194.
195.
196.
197.
198.
199.
200.
201.
202.

Id.
41
Id.
Id.

at 739-40, 581 S.E.2d at 251.
Va. App. 101, 582 S.E.2d 448 (Ct. App. 2003).
at 106, 582 S.E.2d at 450.
at 107, 582 S.E.2d at 451 (quoting Gomez v. Atkins, 296 F.3d 253, 262 (4th Cir.

Id. at 109, 582 S.E.2d at 452.
264 Va. 568, 570 S.E.2d 836 (2002).
508 U.S. 366(1993).
Murphy, 264 Va. at 571, 570 S.E.2d at 837.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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Based upon his training and experience, the officer concluded
that the bag contained marijuana. 2°3 The Supreme Court of Virginia reversed the defendant's conviction, finding that the officer
exceeded the scope of a protective frisk for weapons.2 °4 It opined
that the officer did not testify that his sense of touch prompted
him to conclude that the object was a weapon, nor did he state
that it was "immediately apparent" to him once he touched the
object that it was marijuana.2 "' The court pointed out that all the
officer could say based upon his sense of touch was that the object
was a plastic bag.20 6 The belief that it contained marijuana was
based on his training and experience after feeling the bag.20 7
Thus, the court concluded that the information provided by the
officer's sense of touch was insufficient under Dickerson to establish probable cause to go beyond the frisk and conduct a search.20 8
In Craddock v. Commonwealth, °9 the Court of Appeals of Virginia combined an analysis of Virginia law relating to strip
searches and the Supreme Court of the United States' standard
for searching detainees2 10 to determine whether the defendant's
Fourth Amendment rights were violated.2 1' The court looked at
the "'scope of the particular intrusion' and the "'manner' in which
the search was conducted" and determined that the defendant's
rights were not violated.2 12 The court of appeals agreed with the
trial court that the facts supported the conclusion that the search
was a strip search rather than a body cavity search. 21 3' The officer
saw the bag between the defendant's buttocks before the police
found it necessary to physically pry his legs apart to remove it.2" 4
Further, the court determined that the "manner" in which the
search was accomplished was reasonable. 2 5 The officers removed
the defendant's clothing in an isolated holding cell and did not in-

203. Id.
204. Id. at 574, 570 S.E.2d at 839.
205. Id.
206. Id.
207. Id.
208. Id.
209. 40 Va. App. 539, 580 S.E.2d 454 (Ct. App. 2003).
210. See Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 558-59 (1979) (discussing the test of reasonableness under the Fourth Amendment for detainee searches).
211. Craddock, 40 Va. App. at 547, 580 S.E.2d at 458.
212. Id. at 550-51, 580 S.E.2d at 460 (quoting Bell, 441 U.S. at 559).
213. Id. at 550, 580 S.E.2d at 460.
214. Id.
215. Id. at 551, 580 S.E.2d at 460.

UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 38:87

trude into any body cavity.2 16 Thus, the search of the detainee was
lawful.2 17
In Kidd v. Commonwealth,2 18 the Court of Appeals of Virginia
considered the constitutionality of a strip search that followed a
protective frisk for weapons and the defendant's consent.2 19 The
initial frisk focused on the defendant's crotch, where the officer
had seen an unnatural bulge.22 ° When he felt an object with a
hard edge, the officer pulled the defendant's sweatpants away
from his body to look down in that area. 221 The officer saw a
change purse, which he removed. 222 The defendant told the officer
"'that's all I've got, you can check me.' 223 In response, the officer
pulled back the sweatpants as well as the defendant's boxer
shorts, exposing a plastic baggie of cocaine. 224 The court of appeals opined that the defendant knowingly and voluntarily authorized the search.2 25
6. Use of Force To Resist an Illegal Seizure
Virginia courts have held that a defendant is permitted to use
reasonable force to resist an illegal arrest.22 6 In Commonwealth v.
Hill,227 the Supreme Court of Virginia concluded that this right
did not extend to the use of force to resist an illegal detention.228
In Hill, the officer illegally detained the suspect based upon an
insufficient tip and then tried to conduct a frisk.22 9 In response,
the suspect punched the officer in the face and proceeded to fight
with three officers.23 0 The police subdued Hill and, following a

216.
217.
218.
219.
220.
221.
222.
223.
224.
225.
226.
(1963).
227.
228.
229.
230.

Id.
Id. at 552, 580 S.E.2d at 461.
38 Va. App. 433, 565 S.E.2d 337 (Ct. App. 2002).
Id. at 441, 565 S.E.2d at 341.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 447, 565 S.E.2d at 344.
See, e.g., Banner v. Commonwealth, 204 Va. 640, 646-47, 133 S.E.2d 305, 309-10
264 Va. 541, 570 S.E.2d 805 (2002).
Id. at 546, 570 S.E.2d at 808.
Id. at 544-46, 570 S.E.2d at 806-08.
Id. at 544, 570 S.E.2d at 806.
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search, discovered cocaine on his person." 1 He claimed that because his detention was illegal, he was permitted to use force.23 2
The supreme court disagreed, holding that in contrast to an arrest, "a detention is, by its nature, a brief intrusion on an individual's liberty."23 3 Permitting the use of force in such situations, the
court concluded, "would only serve to increase the danger of violence inherent in such detentions."2 3 4
B. Fifth and Sixth Amendment
1. Double Jeopardy
In Neff v. Commonwealth,23 5 the defendant was convicted in the
general district court of driving under the influence ("D.U.I.") and
he appealed to the circuit court.2 36 While that appeal was pending, Neff was charged with a second offense D.U.I. 23 7 Prior to trial
in the general district court on the second D.U.I. charge, the
Commonwealth moved for a continuance.2 38 The court refused to
grant the continuance and further denied a motion for a nolle
prosequi.239 The prosecution declined to present any evidence and
the charge was dismissed. 2 ° The Commonwealth later directly
indicted Neff in the circuit court for the D.U.I., second offense,
and he was convicted in that court.241 The Court of Appeals of
Virginia rejected Neff's arguments that either double jeopardy or
res judicata barred the conviction in circuit court.2 42 Jeopardy had
not attached because no witnesses were sworn and no evidence
was presented. 24 3 Res judicata did not apply since the dismissal in
general district court was not based on the merits of the case; instead, "'[it was the equivalent of a nolle prosequi [that did] not'

231.
232.
233.
234.
235.
236.
237.
238.
239.
240.
241.
242.
243.

Id.
Id. at 546, 570 S.E.2d at 807.
Id. at 548, 570 S.E.2d at 808.
Id. at 548, 570 S.E.2d at 809.
39 Va. App. 13, 569 S.E.2d 72 (Ct. App. 2002).
Id. at 15, 569 S.E.2d at 73.
Id.
See id.
Id. at 15-16, 569 S.E.2d at 73-74.
Id. at 16, 569 S.E.2d at 74.
Id.
Id. at 17, 569 S.E.2d at 74.
Id.
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actually or constructively establish the guilt or innocence of the
accused."2
In Ragsdale v. Commonwealth,2 45 the Court of Appeals of Virginia considered whether carnal knowledge of a child was a
lesser-included offense of rape.24 6 The defendant had originally
been charged with rape.24 7 However, he was not brought to trial
in a timely manner under the speedy trial statute and this charge
was dismissed.2 4 The Commonwealth proceeded to indict
Ragsdale for carnal knowledge.2 49 In response, Ragsdale claimed
that this second prosecution was barred by the Double Jeopardy
Clause.5 The court analyzed the elements of the two offenses
under the Blockburger251 test to determine "'whether each [statutory] provision requires proof of a fact which the other does
not."'25 2 The court of appeals concluded that rape requires proof of
sexual intercourse and the use of force, which are not required in
a prosecution for carnal knowledge.2" 3 A prosecution for carnal
knowledge requires proof that the victim is between thirteen and
fifteen years old, an element not found in a prosecution for
rape.2 54 Therefore, while the Commonwealth could not proceed
with a prosecution for rape, the Double Jeopardy Clause did not
preclude Ragsdale's conviction for carnal knowledge of a minor.2 55
2.

Statutory Double Jeopardy

With the ever-growing federalization of criminal law as a backdrop, the court of appeals in Londono v. Commonwealth256 examined the scope of the statutory double jeopardy provision in Vir-

244. Id. at 20, 569 S.E.2d at 76 (quoting Ward v. Reasor, 98 Va. 399, 403, 36 S.E. 470,
471 (1900)).
245. 38 Va. App. 421, 565 S.E.2d 331 (Ct. App. 2002).
246. Id. at 424-25, 565 S.E.2d at 333. Compare VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-63 (Repl. Vol.
1996), with VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-61 (Cum. Supp. 2003).
247. Ragsdale, 38 Va. App. at 424, 565 S.E.2d at 333.
248. Id.
249. Id.
250. Id. at 425, 565 S.E.2d at 333.
251. Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 303 (1932).
252. Ragsdale, 38 Va. App. at 427, 565 S.E.2d at 334 (quoting Dalo v. Commonwealth,
37 Va. App. 156, 162, 554 S.E.2d 705, 708 (Ct. App. 2001) (citation omitted)).
253. Id. at 428, 565 S.E.2d at 335.
254. Id.
255. Id. at 428-29, 565 S.E.2d at 335.
256. 40 Va. App. 377, 579 S.E.2d 641 (Ct. App. 2003).
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ginia Code section 19.2-294.57 The defendant was originally
charged in federal court with conspiracy to distribute heroin and
possession with the intent to distribute.2 8 However, the United
States District Court granted a motion to suppress. 259 Londono
was then charged and eventually convicted in state court for
transporting heroin into the Commonwealth and for conspiracy.2 6 °
The court, in affirming the convictions, first noted that Virginia
Code section 19.2-294 bars prosecutions based on a prior prosecution for the "same act." 26 1 To determine whether the two prosecutions involved the same act, the Court must examine "'whether
the same evidence is required to sustain them.' 2 62 The Court held
that proof of the state charges required different evidence from
that required to prove the federal charges. 2" Finally, the court rejected the application of collateral estoppel based on the suppression motion in federal court.2" The court held that there was no
evidence that the Commonwealth was a party to the federal proceeding or that it exercised any control over that prosecution.2 65
Conversely, no evidence showed that the federal prosecutors induced or controlled the state prosecution.2 66
3. Right to Counsel
In Commonwealth v. Redmond,26 7 the Commonwealth asked
the Supreme Court of Virginia to find that the court of appeals
had not sufficiently deferred to the trial court's factual findings
concerning the defendant's invocation of his right to counsel dur-

257. Id. at 392-93, 579 S.E.2d at 698. Virginia Code section 19.2-294, which was subsequently amended, provided that "if the same act be a violation of both a state and a federal statute a prosecution under the federal statute shall be a bar to a prosecution under
the state statute." VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-294 (Repl. Vol. 2000).
258. Londono, 40 Va. App. at 389, 579 S.E.2d at 647.
259. Id.
260. Id. at 391, 579 S.E.2d at 648.
261. Id. at 392-93, 579 S.E.2d at 648.
262. Id. at 393, 579 S.E.2d at 649 (quoting Treu v. Commonwealth, 12 Va. App. 996,
997, 406 S.E.2d 676, 677 (Ct. App. 1991)); see also Estes v. Commonwealth, 212 Va. 23, 24,
181 S.E.2d 622, 624 (1971); Hundley v. Commonwealth, 193 Va. 449, 451, 69 S.E.2d 336,
337 (1952).
263. Londono, 40 Va. App. at 395, 579 S.E.2d at 650.
264. Id. at 406, 579 S.E.2d at 655.
265. Id. at 405, 579 S.E.2d at 654.
266. Id.
267. 264 Va. 321, 568 S.E.2d 695 (2002).
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ing a custodial interrogation.2 68 The supreme court disagreed,
holding that invocations of the right to counsel are legal issues, to
be resolved de novo on appeal.2 69 However, the appellate court
will review a trial court's "findings of historical fact only for clear
error,.. . giv[ing] due weight to inferences drawn from those factual findings."27 ° The supreme court did not agree with the government's argument that the police interrogation must be viewed
in its entirety, including statements made after a purported request for counsel, in determining whether the defendant made a
clear assertion of his right to counsel.2 71 The court said that
statements made after the purported invocation of the right to
counsel are not relevant. 2 The court ultimately concluded that
the defendant did not make a clear and unambiguous assertion of
his right to counsel when he stated "'[c]an I speak to my lawyer? I
can't even talk to [a] lawyer before I make any kinds of comments
or anything?' 2 73
The Supreme Court of Virginia reaffirmed the "offense specific"
feature of the right to counsel in Alston v. Commonwealth."4 Alston was arrested in connection with a burglary of the One Stop
Pet Shop.27 5 Counsel was appointed by the court and the defendant was remanded to the jail. 6 While Alston was incarcerated,
a detective spoke with him concerning several burglaries, including one at the Tidewater Feed and Seed store.27 7 At the time,
Alston had not been charged with burglarizing that store.2 78 During this interview, the defendant confessed to the burglary at the
Feed and Seed store.2 79 He sought to suppress this statement, arguing that the invocation of his right to counsel for one burglary
applied to the other burglary which was "so closely related in
place, time, and modus operandi as to make the interrogation in
the Feed and Seed case 'a part and parcel of a single prosecu-

268.
269.
270.
271.
272.
273.
274.
275.
276.
277.
278.
279.

Id. at 326, 568 S.E.2d at 697.
Id. at 326, 568 S.E.2d at 697-98.
Id. at 327, 568 S.E.2d at 698.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 330, 568 S.E.2d at 700 (second alteration in original).
264 Va. 433, 437, 570 S.E.2d 801, 803 (2002).
Id. at 435, 570 S.E.2d at 804.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 435-36, 570 S.E.2d at 802.
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tion. '' 2"° The court held that the defendant suffered no violation of
his Sixth Amendment right to counsel.2"' The court reasoned that
the burglaries were separate offenses, committed at different
times and against different victims, and the connection between
the two was, in fact, minimal.28 2 The court also noted that the
statement was only used against him in the prosecution for burglarizing the Feed and Seed store. 8 3
III. SPECIFIC CRIMES
A. Assault and Battery
Over the years, the General Assembly has steadily increased
the categories of persons protected by an enhanced penalty under
the assault and battery statute, Virginia Code section 18.257(B).2" 4 Racially motivated attacks, for example, are now punished more harshly under other provisions of the Virginia Code.28 5
In Carfagno v. Commonwealth, s6 the Court of Appeals of Virginia
held that the trial court properly concluded that the use of racial
slurs before and during a battery constituted sufficient circumstantial evidence that the attack was racially motivated.2 7
B. ForgingPublic Documents
The defendant in Hines v. Commonwealth.. was convicted of
five separate counts of forging a public document.2 9 Hines had
signed his brother's name and provided his brother's birth date
and social security number for five summonses that were issued
following one traffic stop.2 90 He argued that the single larceny

280. Id. at 437, 570 S.E.2d at 804.
281. Id. at 438, 570 S.E.2d at 804.
282. Id.
283. Id.
284. VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-57(B) (Cum. Supp. 2003). This section of the Virginia Code
raises the penalty from a Class 1 misdemeanor to a Class 6 felony for certain assaults or
batteries. Id.
285. See id.
286. 39 Va. App. 718, 576 S.E.2d 765 (Ct. App. 2003).
287. Id. at 725, 576 S.E.2d at 768.
288. 39 Va. App. 752, 576 S.E.2d 781 (Ct. App. 2003).
289. Id. at 753, 576 S.E.2d at 782.
290. Id. at 754, 576 S.E.2d at 782.
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doctrine, which permits only a single conviction for larceny where
several items are taken at the same time,2 9' should be expanded
to cover the five forged summonses.2 9 2 Hines noted that the forgeries stemmed from a single intent to avoid the outstanding
warrants.29 3 The court disagreed.29 4 Relying on the plain language
of the public documents forgery statute, the difference between
larceny and forgery, and the narrow interpretation given to the
single larceny doctrine, the court affirmed Hines's five separate
convictions .295
C. ConcealingMerchandise
In Hulcher v. Commonwealth,2 96 the defendant challenged his
conviction for concealing or taking possession of merchandise.2 9 7
He argued that the stolen items--display boxes that were not for
sale-did not constitute "goods or merchandise" under Virginia
Code section 18.2-103.29" The court of appeals affirmed his conviction, holding that the statute does not require that the merchandise be for sale.2 99
D. ConstructionFraud
The Court of Appeals of Virginia, in Holsapple v. Commonwealth, °° clarified a number of issues relating to prosecutions for
fraudulently obtaining an advance of payment for construction
work. 30 ' First, the court held that the Commonwealth must prove
that the victim sent notice by certified mail and requested a return receipt. 3 2 However, the statute does not require the defendant to receive actual notice from the victim.0 3 Second, the court
291. See Richardson v. Commonwealth, 25 Va. App. 491, 496, 489 S.E.2d 697, 700 (Ct.
App. 1997).
292. Hines, 39 Va. App. at 755, 576 S.E.2d at 782.
293. Id.
294. Id. at 755-57, 576 S.E.2d at 783-84.
295. Id.
296. 39 Va. App. 601, 575 S.E.2d 579 (Ct. App. 2003).
297. Id. at 605, 575 S.E.2d at 581.
298. Id. at 605, 575 S.E.2d at 580-81 (emphasis removed).
299. Id. at 609-10, 575 S.E.2d at 583.
300. 39 Va. App. 522, 574 S.E.2d 756 (Ct. App. 2003).
301. See VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-200.1 (Repl. Vol. 1996 & Cum. Supp. 2003).
302. Holsapple, 39 Va. App. at 534-35, 574 S.E.2d at 761-62.
303. Id.
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concluded that work that is so poor as to render a dwelling unsafe
or uninhabitable could constitute a failure to perform." 4 Finally,
the court of appeals held that the trial court properly considered
building code violations in determining that the workmanship
was faulty." 5
E. DrivingRelated Offenses
In Oliver v. Commonwealth, °6 the Court of Appeals of Virginia
held that the Commonwealth was not required to obtain a blood
test from a defendant who had rendered himself unconscious by
his consumption of alcohol. °7 The court noted that the defendant
did not contest the finding that he was intoxicated when he was
arrested and he demonstrated no prejudice from the failure to
take the blood test.30 ' In a noteworthy concurrence, Judge Humphreys wrote separately to stress his conclusion that the plain
language of the implied consent statute "does not obligate an arresting officer to elect to conduct any chemical testing ... [but]
merely provides that a suspect is deemed to have consented to
such tests and establishes certain guidelines for testing in the
event the testing option is utilized."0 9
In another D.U.I. case, Williams v. Commonwealth,31 ° the defendant was arrested and charged with D.U.I., second offense.3 1
Before his trial on that charge, he was again arrested and
charged with a D.U.I., third offense.3 12 He argued that he could
not be punished with a D.U.I., third offense, because he had not
yet been convicted of the second offense.1 3 The Supreme Court of
Virginia affirmed his conviction for the D.U.I., third offense, reasoning that the unambiguous statutory language of Virginia Code
section 18.2-270 authorized such punishment. 4 In addition, the

304.
victim
S.E.2d
305.
306.
307.
308.
309.
310.
311.
312.
313.
314.

Id. at 537, 574 S.E.2d at 763. In Holsapple, the building inspector informed the
that her house was uninhabitable due to faulty workmanship. Id. at 531, 574
at 760.
Id. at 537, 574 S.E.2d at 763.
40 Va. App. 20, 577 S.E.2d 514 (Ct. App. 2003).
Id. at 24, 577 S.E.2d at 516.
Id.
Id. at 28, 577 S.E.2d at 518 (Humphreys, J., concurring).
265 Va. 268, 576 S.E.2d 468 (2003).
Id. at 270, 576 S.E.2d at 469.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 271-72, 576 S.E.2d at 470.
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court said that to hold otherwise would permit a defendant to violate the statute repeatedly without facing a felony conviction. 15
Such a conclusion would undermine the deterrence rationale of
the statute.316
A case with implications for any convictions that require proof
of a predicate offense is Wilson v. Commonwealth.317 In Wilson,
the defendant was charged with driving after having been declared a habitual offender, second or subsequent offense. 31" At
trial, the Commonwealth introduced a certified copy of a warrant
to prove a prior conviction.319 On the warrant, the general district
court made a notation that the defendant pled guilty to a charge
of driving after having been found to be a habitual offender.32 °
However, the warrant failed to memorialize a finding of guilt.321
Wilson argued that the Commonwealth failed to establish a prior
conviction.322 The court held that the notation on the warrant that
the defendant had pled guilty-"'a self-supplied conviction"'combined with the sentence imposed, sufficed to prove the prior
conviction.323
Many jurisdictions in Virginia contain federal facilities within
their boundaries. In Campbell v. Commonwealth,324 the defendant
was convicted of driving as a habitual offender, second offense.325
He claimed that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to hear his
case, because the road on which he traveled was exclusively
within the boundaries of a federal military base.326 The Court of
Appeals of Virginia held that Virginia retains concurrent jurisdiction to prosecute crimes on land ceded to the federal government.327 In reaching this conclusion, the court drew from the cessation deed itself and from established sovereignty law.328
Campbell also argued that his arrest occurred on a road that did
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317.
318.
319.
320.
321.
322.
323.
324.
325.
326.
327.
328.

Id.
Id.
40 Va. App. 250, 578 S.E.2d 831 (Ct. App. 2003).
Id. at 252, 578 S.E.2d at 832.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 254, 578 S.E.2d at 833.
39 Va. App. 180, 571 S.E.2d 906 (Ct. App. 2002).
Id. at 184, 571 S.E.2d at 908.
Id.
Id. at 191, 571 S.E.2d at 912.
Id. at 187-88, 571 S.E.2d at 909-11.
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not constitute a "highway" because it contained gated checkpoints.3 29 The court concluded that even if certain portions of the
road were gated, the defendant was apprehended on the unrestricted, public portion of the road.33 ° Therefore, he was traveling
on a "highway" for purposes of Virginia law.33 '
In Wright v. Commonwealth,"2 the defendant was convicted of
maiming as a result of driving while intoxicated under Virginia
Code section 18.2-51.4. 333 Wright argued that the prosecution
could not rely on proof of his intoxication "to establish that he
drove in a manner so gross, wanton and culpable as to show a
reckless disregard for human life." 334 The Court of Appeals of Virginia relied on well-established definitions of criminal negligence
to resolve the issue. 335 The court held that while intoxication does
not establish reckless driving, it is a factor that might bear upon
proof of dangerous or reckless driving.33 6 Moreover, the intoxication is relevant in establishing the degree of the defendant's neg33 7
ligence, which "increas[es] with the level of intoxication." Ultimately, the court held that the evidence of intoxication combined
with the defendant's admission that he was driving his car "'too
fast"' were sufficient to show that33 his actions constituted gross,
culpable, and wanton misconduct. 1
F. Obstruction of Justice/ Witness Tampering
In a case of first impression, Law v. Commonwealth,3 39 the
Court of Appeals of Virginia was called upon to interpret Virginia
Code section 18.2-441.1, which prohibits offering money or something of value to prevent that person from testifying and also
prohibits offering money or something of value to influence someone into testifying falsely. 4 In Law, the defendant's friend had

329.
330.
331.
332.
333.
334.
335.
336.
337.
338.
339.
340.

Id. at 186, 571 S.E.2d at 909.
Id. at 190-91, 571 S.E.2d at 911-12.
Id. at 190, 571 S.E.2d at 912.
39 Va. App. 698, 576 S.E.2d 242 (Ct. App. 2003).
Id. at 700, 576 S.E.2d at 243.
Id. at 702, 576 S.E.2d at 244.
Id. at 702-03, 576 S.E.2d at 244.
Id. at 704, 576 S.E.2d at 244.
Id.
Id. at 704-05, 576 S.E.2d at 245.
39 Va. App. 154, 571 S.E.2d 893 (Ct. App. 2002).
Id. at 158, 571 S.E.2d at 895.
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been charged with sexual assault.3 4 1 Prior to the preliminary
hearing, Law approached the mother of the complaining witness
and offered her "'$500 to squash [the case], to keep the white man
out of it.' 342 The court first concluded that the targeted person
under the statute need not be a witness.34 3 However, the court
held that the defendant's statement to the complaining witness's
mother did not demonstrate an intent to induce her not to testify
or to testify falsely. 4 4 The court said that even if the statement
constituted a request to dismiss the charge, such behavior would
not qualify under twin prohibitions of Virginia Code section 18.2441. 1.345
G. ThreateningLetters
In Keyes v. Commonwealth,3 4 6 the Court of Appeals of Virginia
addressed several issues relating to the prohibition against
threatening letters." v First, the court noted that an inmate who
used the institutional mail had, in fact, "sent the letter or procured its sending."34 The intended recipient of the letter, identified in the letter as a "Target," was a woman whom Keyes had attempted to rape.3 49 Keyes made crass statements in the letter that
implied that the target would be raped in the future, and he
signed the letter "The Nightmare Child."35 ° The court held that
this evidence sufficed to demonstrate that the letter was threatening. 5 '
H. Trespass
In Virginia v. Hicks,35 2 the Supreme Court of the United States
reversed and remanded the Supreme Court of Virginia's decision
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344.
345.
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349.
350.
351.
352.

Id. at 156, 571 S.E.2d at 894.
Id. (alteration in original).
Id. at 159, 571 S.E.2d at 895.
Id. at 159-60, 571 S.E.2d at 895-96.
Id. at 160, 571 S.E.2d at 896.
39 Va. App. 294, 572 S.E.2d 512 (Ct. App. 2002).
VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-60 (Cum. Supp. 2003).
Keyes, 39 Va. App. at 301, 572 S.E.2d at 516.
Id. at 301-02, 572 S.E.2d at 516.
Id. at 302, 572 S.E.2d at 516.
Id.
123 S. Ct. 2191 (2003).
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in Commonwealth v. Hicks.3 5 The Supreme Court of Virginia had
concluded that a barment policy developed by a public housing
development was overbroad and violated the defendant's First
Amendment rights.35 4 The Supreme Court of the United States
held that the defendant had failed to show that the barment policy was "substantially overbroad judged in relation to its plainly
legitimate sweep."3 55 Hicks, the Court observed, was not punished
for any expressive conduct, such as leafleting or demonstrating.3 5 6
The Court also found that the housing authority had applied the
rules to all those who sought entry on the property, "not just to
those who seek to engage in expression."5 7 The Court left open
any challenges to the conviction "on other grounds." 5 8
IV. EVIDENCE
There have been a number of published and unpublished decisions relating to evidence in some fashion. A few cases are particularly noteworthy and will be briefly discussed here.
A. Admissibility of a Child's Testimony by Television
In Parrish v. Commonwealth,35 9 the Court of Appeals of Virginia considered a challenge to the application of Virginia Code
section 18.2-67.9 (permitting a court to order that testimony of a
child be taken by closed-circuit television under certain conditions).3 6 ° The court, applying the standard set forth in Maryland
3 61 in which a similar Maryland statute was upheld,3 62
v. Craig,
found that the Commonwealth met its burden under the statute
and made an adequate showing of necessity for the procedure.36 3
The court of appeals noted that, based on the record, it could not

353.

264 Va. 48, 563 S.E.2d 674 (2002).

354. Id. at 60, 563 S.E.2d at 681.
355.

Hicks, 123 S. Ct. at 2198.

356. Id. at 2199.
357.
358.

Id.
Id.

359. 38 Va. App. 607, 567 S.E.2d 576 (Ct. App. 2002).
360. Id. at 609, 567 S.E.2d at 577.
361. 497 U.S. 836 (1990).
362.
363.

Id. at 860.
Parrish, 38 Va. App. at 613, 567 S.E.2d at 579.
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find that the trial court erred.3" The trial court determined that
the evidence showed that there was a "substantial likelihood"
that the child victim "would suffer severe emotional trauma" if
forced to testify in the presence of the defendant.36
B. Public'sRight to Access and Re-test DNA
In Globe Newspaper Company v. Commonwealth,366 the Supreme Court of Virginia rejected the newspapers' claims that they
had a right to have access to biological samples from a concluded
criminal case. 367 The newspapers alleged, among other things,

that under the First Amendment to the Constitution of the
United States and under Article I, Section 12 of the Constitution
of Virginia, the public had a right to access and re-test DNA evidence from a completed capital murder case where the defendant
had already been executed. 368 The court found that the newspa-

pers sought the biological material in order to have it re-tested
and generate a new report so as to create new evidence. 369 Thus,
the court reasoned that the "access" sought was access to evidence that did not exist.37 0 The Supreme Court of Virginia con-

cluded that there was no constitutional error and that the trial
court properly denied access to the biological material.37'
C. Admissibility of Expert's "Blood SpatterAnalysis"
In Smith v. Commonwealth, 2 the Supreme Court of Virginia
ruled that an expert witness's rebuttal testimony about "blood
spatter analysis" was properly admitted in the defendant's firstdegree murder trial.373 The court found that such testimony was
"'a well-recognized discipline, based upon the laws of physics."""

364.
365.
366.
367.
368.
369.
370.
371.
372.
373.
374.
(Idaho

Id. at 614-15, 567 S.E.2d at 579.
Id. at 614, 567 S.E.2d at 579.
264 Va. 622, 570 S.E.2d 809 (2002).
Id. at 631, 570 S.E.2d at 813.
Id. at 628, 570 S.E.2d at 811.
Id. at 628-29, 570 S.E.2d at 812.
Id.
Id. at 630, 570 S.E.2d at 813.
265 Va. 250, 576 S.E.2d 465 (2003).
Id. at 255, 576 S.E.2d at 468.
Id. at 252-53, 576 S.E.2d at 467 (quoting State v. Rodgers, 812 P.2d 1208, 1212
1991)).
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D. Admissibility of Sexual-Assault Victim's Diary
In Cairns v. Commonwealth,"' the defendant attempted to introduce one of the victim's journals to attack her credibility during his trial for three counts of forcible sodomy, rape, and producing sexually explicit material.3 76 The Court of Appeals of Virginia,
reviewing the trial court's decision to exclude the journals, found
that the documents should have been admitted to impeach the
victim.377 The diaries discussed sexual encounters, but made no
mention of sexual acts perpetrated by the defendant.3 7 Nevertheless, the court held that any error in failing to admit the diaries
was harmless. 9
E. Standardof Review in Appeal of Conviction
In Commonwealth v. Hudson,"' the Supreme Court of Virginia
reversed a court of appeals' decision and found that the evidence
was sufficient to convict the defendant of second-degree murder of
his wife and a related firearms offense.38 ' The supreme court discussed, at length, the burden of proof at trial in a criminal case
and the appellate standard of review once a defendant is convicted.3 "2 The supreme court noted that the court of appeals erroneously viewed the evidence in the "light most favorable" to the
defendant rather than to the Commonwealth, which is the required standard on appeal.8 3 Finally, the Supreme Court of Virginia examined the Commonwealth's burden relating to "exclusion of reasonable theories of innocence," noting that it only needs
to exclude those "advanced by the accused at trial."38 4

375.
376.
377.
378.
379.
380.
381.
382.
383.
384.

40 Va. App. 271, 579 S.E.2d 340 (Ct. App. 2003).
Id. at 286, 579 S.E.2d at 347.
Id.
Id.
Id.
265 Va. 505, 578 S.E.2d 781 (2003).
Id. at 517, 578 S.E.2d at 787-88.
Id. at 512-16, 578 S.E.2d at 785-87.
Id. at 514, 578 S.E.2d at 786.
Id.
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V. OTHER INCIDENTS OF TRIAL

A. ProsecutorialConduct
Appellate courts addressed prosecutorial conduct in a number
of cases. In Morrissette v. Commonwealth,"5 the defendant faced
trial following a DNA "cold hit" nineteen years after the alleged
rape and murder occurred.3 86 He argued that this delay precluded
him from obtaining corroborating witnesses in support of his alibi.387 The Supreme Court of Virginia explained that the Sixth
Amendment speedy trial clause was not at issue because the delay occurred pre-indictment.8 8 Instead, the defendant could gain
relief under the Due Process Clause if he could show: (1) that the
prosecution intentionally delayed charging him to gain a tactical
advantage; and (2) actual prejudice. 9 The court affirmed the
convictions, holding that the defendant could not establish the
first part of this test.39 °
In Leonard v. Commonwealth,39 ' the Court of Appeals of Virginia addressed the issue of prosecutorial vindictiveness.39 2 The
defendant was originally charged with rape and abduction with
intent to defile.393 The prosecution threatened to bring an addi394
tional attempted murder charge if Leonard did not plead guilty.
The court, in accord with Supreme Court of the United States
precedent, held that a prosecutor may generally threaten to file
more severe charges to induce a guilty plea.3 95 Such threats do not
amount to vindictiveness if the prosecution treats the defendant
no 'worse than he would have been if no plea bargain had been
offered."'3 96 The court concluded that the defendant failed to show
actual vindictiveness. 39 7 The court noted that the fact that an ad-

385. 264 Va. 386, 569 S.E.2d 47 (2002).
386. Id. at 391, 569 S.E.2d at 51.
387. Id. at 392, 569 S.E.2d at 51-52.
388. Id. at 393, 569 S.E.2d at 52.
389. Id.
390. Id.
391. 39 Va. App. 134, 571 S.E.2d 306 (Ct. App. 2002).
392. Id. at 138, 571 S.E.2d at 308.
393. Id.
394. Id. at 139, 571 S.E.2d at 309.
395. Id. at 142-43, 571 S.E.2d at 310-11.
396. Id. at 145, 571 S.E.2d at 312 (quoting United States v. Williams, 47 F.3d 658, 662
(4th Cir. 1995)).
397.

Id.
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ditional attempted murder indictment was brought only a week
before the previously scheduled trial reflected the schedule of the
grand jury and the timing of the plea negotiations rather than
any vindictiveness.9 s
B. JudicialRecusal
In Jackson v. Commonwealth, 9 the defendant asked a judge
to recuse himself.4 .. The judge had been the Commonwealth's Attorney when the defendant was previously prosecuted in that jurisdiction." 1 The judge declined to recuse himself.40 2 The court of
appeals, sitting en banc, reversed.40 3 The court held that while it
was possible that the judge had no knowledge of the case and
played no part in filing charges or framing trial strategy as the
Commonwealth's Attorney, the case must be reversed because the
record did not establish these facts. 404 Echoing a consistent theme
of recent appellate jurisprudence, the court avoided the adverse
public perception that would be created by the possibility of judicial impropriety.4 5 The Supreme Court of Virginia recently
granted the Commonwealth's appeal of this decision.4 6
C. Jury Issues
1.

Jury List

In Butler v. Commonwealth,"' one of the jurors fell ill after
opening statements.4 8 However, a trial in an adjacent courtroom
was canceled and the Commonwealth proposed using that jury
panel for the defendant's trial.40 9 Butler claimed, among other

398.
399.
400.
401.
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Id. at 145-46, 571 S.E.2d at 312.
40 Va. App. 343, 579 S.E.2d 375 (Ct. App. 2003).
Id. at 345, 579 S.E.2d at 376.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 349, 579 S.E.2d at 377.
Id. at 348, 579 S.E.2d at 377.
Id.
Jackson v. Commonwealth, 40 Va. App. 343, 579 S.E.2d 375, appeal docketed, No.
(Va. Sept. 8, 2003).
264 Va. 614, 570 S.E.2d 813 (2002).
Id. at 616, 570 S.E.2d at 814.
Id.
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things, that he was entitled to a continuance because he had not
received a copy of the jury panel list forty-eight hours before
trial.4 1 ° The trial court refused to grant the continuance and the
court of appeals affirmed.41 1 The court of appeals acknowledged
that Virginia Code section 8.01-353 provides that counsel "shall"
be provided with a copy of the jury panel forty-eight hours before
trial.4 12 However, the court found that this language is directory
rather than mandatory.4 13 In addition, the defendant could show
no prejudice.4 14
2. Juror Inattention to a Voir Dire Question
Jurors occasionally fail to answer a question posed during voir
dire. In Blevins v. Commonwealth,41 5 the defendant discovered after he was convicted of malicious wounding, abduction, and object
sexual penetration1 6 that one of the jurors failed to disclose that
she had been the victim of a robbery approximately fifteen years
earlier.41 7 The court conducted a hearing and examined the juror.41 ' The juror explained that her failure to answer the question
was inadvertent.4 19 She also said that this prior experience did
not affect her impartiality.2 The trial court credited her testimony and denied a motion for a mistrial.4 2 ' The court of appeals
gave deference to this finding and concluded that such honest
mistakes will not provide grounds for a mistrial if the juror's impartiality was not implicated. 2
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Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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at 617, 570 S.E.2d at 814.
at 616, 570 S.E.2d at 814.
at 619, 570 S.E.2d at 816.
at 619-20, 570 S.E.2d at 816.
at 620, 570 S.E.2d at 817.
Va. App. 412, 579 S.E.2d 658 (Ct. App. 2003).
at 418, 579 S.E.2d at 661.
at 419-20, 579 S.E.2d at 662.
at 420, 579 S.E.2d at 662.

at 429-30, 579 S.E.2d at 666-67.
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3. Juror Misconduct
In Evans v. Commonwealth,423 the trial judge questioned a juror after trial concerning a conversation the juror had with one of
the defendant's relatives.424 The juror denied that such a conversation had occurred.4 25 Evans later filed a motion for a new trial
on the basis of juror misconduct. 426 In support of the motion, he
attached an affidavit from the same juror that related a conversation between the juror and the defendant's uncle. 427 The juror
stated that he had learned damaging information about the defendant, such as the fact that the defendant was "'always in trouble,"' was 'slick"' and that the defendant's uncle hoped the defendant would receive a "'forty year[]' sentence.42 The Commonwealth filed a conflicting affidavit from-yet again-the same juror in which the juror denied hearing any damaging details. 29
The trial court heard arguments on the defendant's motion for a
mistrial, but denied the motion without an evidentiary hearing.43 °
The court of appeals held that the allegations in the defense affidavit, if true, would constitute grounds for a mistrial.431 The court
explained that a mistrial would have been appropriate because
the defendant might have been prejudiced.432 The court noted
"'that only slight evidence of influence or prejudice as a result of
such misconduct of a juror should be required to warrant the
granting of a new trial.' 4 33 Second, the court held that under such
circumstances, a trial court must investigate further and conduct
an evidentiary hearing to determine whether any misconduct occurred. 4 The failure to do so constituted reversible error.435
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39 Va. App. 229, 572 S.E.2d 481 (Ct. App. 2002).
Id. at 233, 572 S.E.2d at 483.
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Id.
Id.
Id. (quoting Evans Aft. 1 2).
Id. at 234, 572 S.E.2d at 483.
Id. at 235, 572 S.E.2d at 483-84.
Id. at 239, 572 S.E.2d at 485.
Id. at 239, 572 S.E.2d at 486.
Id. at 238, 572 S.E.2d at 485 (quoting Hickerson v. Burner, 186 Va. 66, 72, 41
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Id.at 240, 572 S.E.2d at 486.
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4. Public Perception
A number of appellate decisions addressed the requirement
that jury selection must ensure public confidence in the integrity
of the judicial process. In Pattersonv. Commonwealth,4 3 6 the court
of appeals held that a defendant can raise, for the first time on
appeal, the adverse public perception effect of permitting a particular person to sit on a jury.4 37 The court further concluded that
a juror who had been a police officer for forty-three years,4 38 who
had conversed with members of the sheriffs department concerning the specific case upon which he sat as a juror, and who initially expressed concern about his impartiality, should have been
removed for cause. 9 This is so despite the trial court's finding
that the juror would be impartial. 440 The court relied on the rationale that permitting a juror to hear the case given the circumstances would undermine the public confidence in the judicial
process." 1
In contrast, Perez v. Commonwealth 2 was a rape case in which
a juror acknowledged that his daughter had been sexually assaulted four years before the instant case." 3 However, he did not
initially realize that the detective who participated in the investigation of this case had also investigated his daughter's case.'
When the trial court learned of that fact, it questioned the juror
about his interaction with the detective and made the factual
finding that this juror could be objective." 5 The defendant moved
for a mistrial, but the trial court declined to grant the motion." 6
The court of appeals sustained this ruling." 7 The court credited
the trial court's finding of objectivity and held there was no basis
for a per se exclusion; therefore, the public perception did not
compel the exclusion of this juror."8 The court distinguished prior
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39 Va. App. 658, 576 S.E.2d 222 (Ct. App. 2003).
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40 Va. App. 648, 580 S.E.2d 507 (Ct. App. 2003).
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Id. at 659, 580 S.E.2d at 512.
Id. at 656-59, 580 S.E.2d at 510-12.
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cases, noting that the jurors in those cases had a contemporaneous or continuing relationship with legal counsel or a witness, a
factor not present in this case. 49
5. Right to a Jury of Twelve
In King v. Commonwealth,"' the court of appeals held that the
Constitution of Virginia affords the Commonwealth, like the defendant, a right to have twelve jurors hear the case.45 1 In King, a
juror became ill during the trial. 52 The defendant proposed to go
forward with eleven jurors, but the Commonwealth refused. 53
The trial court found that manifest necessity dictated a mistrial. 54 King argued that there was no manifest necessity for a
mistrial and, therefore, any subsequent prosecution would be
barred by double jeopardy principles.4 1' The trial court's decision
was affirmed on appeal. 4 56 The court concluded that, in the absence of the Commonwealth's consent to proceed with fewer than
twelve jurors present, the absence of twelve jurors created a
manifest necessity. 57 Given this manifest necessity, the Double
Jeopardy Clause did not bar subsequent prosecution.4 58
6. Voir Dire
The Supreme Court of Virginia concluded in Commonwealth v.
Hill459 that, in a non-capital case, neither the defendant nor the
Commonwealth has the right to question the venire concerning
the range of punishments a defendant faces. 60 The court noted
that such questions would only cause the jury to speculate in a
factual vacuum. 61 Furthermore, such questions are not relevant
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Id. at 319, 568 S.E.2d at 676.
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to the voir dire factors outlined in Virginia Code section 8.01-358,
which address opinions about the cause, or bias, or prejudice.4 62
D. Juvenile Issues
In Rodriguez v. Commonwealth,4 6 a juvenile defendant was
charged with second-degree murder.4 64 In accord with Virginia
Code section 16.1-269.1, the juvenile and domestic relations
court, after making a determination of probable cause, certified
the case to the circuit court without a transfer hearing.46 5 Rodriguez objected, arguing that he was entitled as a matter of constitutional law to a transfer hearing to determine whether he should
be treated as an adult.46 6 The court of appeals rejected the defendant's argument that he had a constitutional right to such a
transfer hearing.4 6 7 The court relied on prior Supreme Court of
Virginia holdings, stating that a juvenile is not entitled to a
transfer hearing. 468 The court of appeals found no cases holding
that such a proceeding is constitutionally mandated.4 6 9
The defendant in Hughes v. Commonwealth4 7 ° was charged
with malicious wounding and the case was certified to the circuit
court pursuant to Virginia Code section 16.1-269.1(C).47 1 That section lists certain violent offenses that, once certified to the circuit
court, divest the juvenile court of jurisdiction.4 7 2 Hughes x7as ultimately convicted of unlawful wounding, which is not one of the
violent felonies enumerated in Virginia Code section 16.1269.1(C). 7 3 Hughes argued that "when a juvenile is transferred
pursuant to Code § 16.1-269.1(C) ...the jurisdiction of the juvenile court is not divested if the violent juvenile felony is later
dismissed or reduced to a lesser-included offense which is not one

462. Id.
463. 40 Va. App. 144, 578 S.E.2d 78 (Ct. App. 2003).
464. Id. at 148, 578 S.E.2d at 79.
465. Id. at 149, 578 S.E.2d at 80.
466. Id. at 150, 578 S.E.2d at 80.
467. Id. at 149, 578 S.E.2d at 80.
468. Id.
469. Id. at 153-54, 578 S.E.2d at 82. For additional discussion of certification and
other juvenile issues in Virginia, see Robert E. Shepherd, Jr., Annual Survey of Virginia
Law: Legal Issues Involving Children, 38 U. RICH. L. REV. 161, 169-82 (2003).
470. 39 Va. App. 448, 573 S.E.2d 324 (Ct. App. 2002).
471. Id. at 452, 573 S.E.2d at 325.
472. VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-269.1(C) (Repl. Vol. 2003).
473. Hughes, 39 Va. App. at 452, 573 S.E.2d at 325.
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of the enumerated violent juvenile felonies."474 The court of appeals disagreed, holding that, under the plain language of the
statute, once the juvenile court has certified the charge it is divested of jurisdiction.4 7 The statute "makes no provision for any
[remaining] dormant jurisdiction" that can be revived later.4 76
Finally, in B.P. v. Commonwealth,47 7 the court of appeals affirmed the broad authority of a juvenile court to ensure crime
prevention and juvenile rehabilitation.4 7 The juvenile court found
that the child was in need of supervision because she was habitually absent from school.4 79 The court directed the preparation of a
report on the child's needs and also ordered the child to attend
school.4"' When she did not, the court found her in contempt and
sentenced her to ten days in the juvenile detention center.48 The
juvenile appealed, arguing that the court lacked the authority to
order her to attend school. 8 2 She relied upon Virginia Code section 16.1-278.5 for her argument that the court lacked the authority to issue the order.48 3 She asserted that the court could issue
such an order only after filing an agency report assessing her
needs. 8 4 The court of appeals did not agree with this argument.4 5
The court held that the Virginia Code grants juvenile courts
broad authority in such matters and nothing in the present situation divested the court of the authority to issue such an interlocutory order.48 6 The court also reasoned that it would be "absurd" to
permit a juvenile, already found to be habitually absent from
school, to continue to avoid compulsory school attendance.4 7

474. Id. at 454-55, 573 S.E.2d at 327.
475. Id. at 458, 573 S.E.2d at 328.
476. Id. at 459, 573 S.E.2d at 329.
477. 38 Va. App. 735, 568 S.E.2d 412 (Ct. App. 2002).
478. See id. at 737, 568 S.E.2d at 412.
479. Id. For additional discussion of juveniles and school authority, see Shepherd, supra note 469, at 177.
480. B.P., 38 Va. App. at 737, 568 S.E.2d at 412-13.
481. Id. at 737, 568 S.E.2d at 413.
482. Id.
483. Id. at 738, 568 S.E.2d at 413.
484. Id.
485. Id.
486. Id. at 738-39, 568 S.E.2d at 413-14.
487. Id. at 739, 568 S.E.2d at 414.
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E. Severing Charges
The court of appeals previously held that, in a jury trial, a
charge of felon in possession of a firearm must be severed and
tried separately from other charges to avoid any unfair prejudice
to the defendant.4"' In Vanhook v. Commonwealth, 9 the court of
appeals held that when this scenario occurs in a bench trial, the
felon in possession of a firearm charges need not be severed. 49o A
judge, unlike a jury, has the training and experience to avoid the
prejudice that might affect a jury's perception stemming from the
knowledge that the defendant had been previously convicted of a
felony.49 1
VI. SENTENCING

Most cases in the area of sentencing and punishment are very
fact-driven and specific. Often they are not particularly useful in
the context of application to other cases. However, there are a few
recently decided cases in this area that will be noted.
In McCullough v. Commonwealth,49 2 the Court of Appeals of
Virginia found that the trial court did not err when it ordered restitution in an amount greater than the amount proved in the guilt
phase of trial.493 This was a question of first impression in Virginia and the Supreme Court of Virginia awarded an appeal from
the decision of the court of appeals.49 4
4 95 the Court
In Cuffee-Smith v. Commonwealth,
of Appeals of
Virginia found that where a defendant is required to serve a
mandatory minimum sentence-in this case, the second or subsequent offense of driving after having been declared an habitual
offender 4 9 -- that defendant is ineligible for electronic home monitoring, as permitted under Virginia Code section 53.1-131.2, for

488. See, e.g., Johnson v. Commonwealth, 20 Va. App. 49, 56, 455 S.E.2d 261, 265 (Ct.
App. 1995).
489. 40 Va. App. 130, 578 S.E.2d 71 (Ct. App. 2003).
490. Id. at 136, 578 S.E.2d at 73-74.
491. Id. at 134-35, 578 S.E.2d at 73.
492. 38 Va. App. 811, 568 S.E.2d 449 (Ct. App. 2002).
493. Id. at 814, 568 S.E.2d at 450.
494. McCullough v. Commonwealth, 38 Va. App. 811, 568 S.E.2d 449, appeal docketed,
No. 022250 (Va. Jan. 8, 2003).
495. 39 Va. App. 476, 574 S.E.2d 294 (Ct. App. 2002).
496. VA. CODE ANN. § 46.2-357 (Repl. Vol. 2002 & Cum. Supp. 2003).
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the duration of the mandatory minimum sentence.49 7 The court
relied on the plain language of the statute in reaching this conclusion.49 8
VII. POST TRIAL/REVOCATIONS

Virginia Code section 19.2-295.2 generally authorizes a trial
court, subject to certain limitations, to impose a term of post release supervision in addition to any incarceration.49 9 In Lamb v.
Commonwealth, °° the trial court sought to impose such a term of
post-release supervision following a revocation proceeding, rather
than after a criminal trial."' The court of appeals concluded that
Virginia Code section 19.2-295.2 can only be employed following
the original judgment of conviction. 50 2 The imposition of an additional term of post-release supervision following a revocation constituted error. 0 3
In Leitao v. Commonwealth,0 4 the Court of Appeals of Virginia
reviewed the actions of a trial court that had repeatedly revoked
portions of a suspended sentence. 0 5 During one of the revocations, the trial court did not explicitly re-suspend the balance of
the original sentence.50 6 This order reimposed only a portion of
the original sentence and returned the defendant to probation following his release from prison.50 7 The court concluded that this
failure to explicitly re-suspend the balance of the original sentence did not eliminate this balance.5 0 8 The court deferred to the
trial court's interpretation of its own order and concluded that the
trial court committed no error in later reimposing the remaining

497.
498.
499.
500.
501.
502.
503.
504.
505.
506.
507.
508.

Cuffee-Smith, 39 Va. App. at 483, 574 S.E.2d at 297.
Id. at 482-83, 574 S.E.2d at 297.
VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-295.2 (Repl. Vol. 2000 & Cum. Supp. 2003).
40 Va. App. 52, 577 S.E.2d 530 (Ct. App. 2003).
Id. at 55, 577 S.E.2d at 531.
Id. at 57, 577 S.E.2d at 532.
Id. at 58, 577 S.E.2d at 533.
39 Va. App. 435, 573 S.E.2d 317 (Ct. App. 2002).
Id. at 436-37, 573 S.E.2d at 318.
Id. at 437, 573 S.E.2d at 318.
Id.
Id. at 438, 573 S.E.2d at 319.
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balance of the sentence. 0 9 This remaining balance, the court of
appeals concluded, was implicitly suspended by the prior order.5 1 °
The court of appeals addressed a related issue in McFarlandv.
Commonwealth.51 In that 1995 case, the trial court sentenced the
defendant to a term of ten years, all suspended, for possessing a
sawed-off shotgun and pointing a gun at two deputies. 1'2 The trial
court also ordered supervised probation." 3 McFarland was
"[o]rdered to keep the peace [and] be of good behavior." 1 4 McFarland complied with the terms of his supervised probation, which
the court terminated in 1996, again on the condition that he be of
good behavior.5 15 In 2001, McFarland desired to enlist in the
armed services and sought to modify the 1995 order to eliminate
the requirement that he be of good behavior. 6 The trial court
concluded that it lacked jurisdiction to grant the defendant's request.1 7 The court of appeals agreed. 1 8 The court held that Virginia Code section 19.2-304 authorizes a court to alter the conditions of probation.519 However, the statute does not confer this
authority with respect to the conditions of a suspended sentence. 52 0 Therefore, the passage of more than twenty-one days after the entry of the final order deprived the trial court of jurisdiction to alter the "good behavior" condition of the suspended
sentence.
5 22 a habeas
In Miles v. Sheriff of the Virginia Beach City Jail,
corpus case with sweeping implications for the volume of criminal
appeals, the Supreme Court of Virginia concluded that even
though a defendant pled guilty, if he timely and clearly instructed
his attorney to appeal, the attorney must appeal.52 3 A failure to
appeal under those circumstances amounts to ineffective assis-

509. Id. at 439, 573 S.E.2d at 319.
510. Id. at 438, 573 S.E.2d at 319.
511. 39 Va. App. 511, 574 S.E.2d 311 (Ct. App. 2002).
512. Id. at 513, 574 S.E.2d at 312.
513. Id.
514. Id.
515. Id.
516. Id. at 513-14, 574 S.E.2d at 312.
517. Id. at 513, 574 S.E.2d at 312.
518. Id.
519. Id. at 515, 574 S.E.2d at 313.
520. Id.
521. Id. at 517, 574 S.E.2d at 314.
522. 266 Va. 110, 581 S.E.2d 191 (2003).
523. Id. at 112, 581 S.E.2d at 192.
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tance of counsel.52 4 The court rejected the respondent's argument
that the narrow range of issues that can be appealed following a
guilty plea required a habeas petitioner to identify a viable appellate issue.5 2 Of course, if there are5 only
frivolous issues to appeal,
26
counsel should file an Anders brief.
VIII. LEGISLATION
A. Capital Litigation
52 7 prohibiting the
Following the decision in Atkins v. Virginia,
execution of the mentally retarded,52 8 the General Assembly enacted legislation that defines mental retardation, establishes procedures for determining whether a defendant meets the definition, and establishes procedures for the appointment of experts to
conduct the evaluation. 2 9 The finding of mental retardation is a
factual determination to be made by the jury, or the judge in a
bench trial.53 ° The defendant bears the burden of establishing retardation by a preponderance of the evidence. 3' Virginia Code
section 8.01-654.2 also creates a procedure to raise such claims
for persons sentenced to death prior to the Atkins decision. 2 Finally, during the course of the sentencing proceeding, the Commonwealth cannot use any statements that the defendant makes
while being evaluated.5 3 3

524. Id. at 115-16, 581 S.E.2d at 194.
525. Id. at 116, 581 S.E.2d at 195.
526. Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967); see also Brown v. Warden, 238 Va. 551,
385 S.E.2d 587 (1989); Kuzminski v. Commonwealth, 8 Va. App. 106, 378 S.E.2d 632 (Ct.
App. 1989).
527. 536 U.S. 304 (2002). For a more extensive discussion of the Atkins decision, see
Jaime L. Henshaw, Note, Atkins v. Virginia, The Court's Failure to Recognize What Lies
Beneath, 37 U. RICH. L. REV. 1185 (2003).
528. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 321.
529. Act of May 1, 2003, ch. 1040, 2003 Va. Acts (codified as amended at VA. CODE
ANN. § 8.01-654.2 (Cum. Supp. 2003); id. §§ 19.2-264.3:1.1, -264.3:1.2, -264.3:1.3 (Cum.
Supp. 2003)).
530. VA. CODE. ANN. § 19.2-264.3:1.1(C) (Cum. Supp. 2003).
531. Id.
532. Id. § 8.01-654.2 (Cum. Supp. 2003).
533. Id. § 19.2-264.3:3 (Cum. Supp. 2003).
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B. Identification
Following on the heels of anti-terrorist legislation enacted over
the past few years, the General Assembly created a Class 6 felony
offense for those who obtain Department of Motor Vehicles documents through the use of counterfeit, forged, or altered documents.534 The law also restricts the issuance of such documents to
United States citizens or those legally present in the country. 35
In addition, the law imposes more stringent requirements for obtaining licenses, permits, and identification cards. 36
C. Alcohol
A front-page article in Lawyer's Weekly brought attention to an
unpublished order by the Court of Appeals of Virginia, Dalton v.
Commonwealth, 3 ' which reversed the finding of the circuit court
that the court had jurisdiction in an underage possession of alcohol case.53 The juvenile was found intoxicated in an automobile
but not in "possession" of an alcoholic beverage. 39 The difficulty
arose in establishing where the juvenile had possessed the alcohol. 540 In response, the General Assembly amended Virginia Code
section 4.1-305, which now permits the prosecution "either in the
county or city in which the alcohol was possessed or consumed, or
in the county or city in which the person exhibits evidence of
physical indicia of consumption of alcohol."5 4 1 The General As-

sembly also changed the law requiring a court to dismiss DUI or
refusal proceedings against a juvenile if: (1) the license has been
restored; (2) the terms and conditions imposed have been met;
and (3) the violation did not result in death or injury of any person. 542 Now, the courts will have the discretion to dismiss such
534. Act of Mar. 22, 2003, ch. 819, 2003 Va. Acts
ANN. § 46.2-105.2 (Supp. 2003)).
535.

-

(codified as amended at VA. CODE

VA. CODE ANN. § 46.2-328.1 (Supp. 2003).

536. Id. Portions of this legislation become effective on January 1, 2004 and others become effective on July 1, 2004. Id.
537. No. 1466-01-3, 2002 Va. App. LEXIS 113 (Ct. App. Jan. 22, 2002) (unpublished
order).
538. John D. Tuerck, Jurisdiction Is Key in DUI 'Possession' Case, VA. LAW. WKLY.,
Feb. 18, 2002, at 1.
539. Id. at 13.
540. Id. at 1.
541. Act of Mar. 22, 2003, ch. 845, 2003 Va. Acts (codified as amended at VA. CODE
ANN. § 4.1-305(A) (Cum. Supp. 2003)).
542. Act of Mar. 16, 2003, ch. 118, 2003 Va. Acts __ (codified as amended at VA. CODE

2003]

CRIMINAL LAW

proceedings.54 3 Finally, the legislature eliminated the requirement that police officers provide the accused with information
concerning how to obtain an independent analysis of the second
vial of blood.544
D. Drugs / Tobacco
The General Assembly altered the punishment for persons who
possess firearms while possessing a Schedule I or II drug. Previously, all such cases required a mandatory minimum term of incarceration of three years."' Under the amendments to Virginia
Code section 18.2-308.4: (1) constructive possession of a firearm
while possessing drugs is a Class 6 felony with no mandatory
minimum;5 46 (2) possession of a firearm on or about the person
while possessing drugs constitutes a Class 6 felony with a mandatory minimum punishment of two years; 547 and finally, (3) one
who possesses drugs and uses, displays, or attempts to use a firearm is guilty of a Class 6 felony and faces a mandatory minimum
of five years.54S
A defendant no longer must intend to distribute the drugs on or
near school property to fall under the strictures of Virginia Code
section 18.2-255.2."' 9 This amendment to the law effectively reverses the Court of Appeals of Virginia's decision in Toliver v.
Commonwealth,55 1 which concluded that a defendant must intend
to sell the drugs within 1,000 feet of the school zone to be convicted under this provision.55 '
The legislature also minted a new crime, prohibiting the sale or
purchase of "wrappings" to minors. 55 2' The new legislation defined

ANN. §
543.
544.
ANN. §
545.
ANN. §
546.
547.
548.
549.
ANN. §
550.
551.
552.
ANN. §

16.1-278.9 (Repl. Vol. 2003)).
See id.
Act of Mar. 24, 2003, ch. 936, 2003 Va. Acts (codified as amended at VA. CODE
18.2-268.6 (Cum. Supp. 2003)).
Act of Mar. 24, 2003, ch. 949, 2003 Va. Acts (codified as amended at VA. CODE
18.2-308.4(B) (Cum. Supp. 2003)).
Id. (codified as amended at VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-308.4(A) (Cum. Supp. 2003)).
Id. (codified as amended at VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-308.4(B) (Cum. Supp. 2003)).
Id. (codified as amended at VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-308.4(C) (Cum. Supp. 2003)).
Act of Mar. 16, 2003, ch. 80, 2003 Va. Acts (codified as amended at VA. CODE
18.2-255.2(A) (Cum. Supp. 2003)).
38 Va. App. 27, 561 S.E.2d 743 (Ct. App. 2002).
Id. at 33-34, 561 S.E.2d at 746.
Act of Mar. 18, 2003, ch. 615, 2003 Va. Acts _ (codified as amended at VA. CODE
18.2-371.2(A) (Cum. Supp. 2003)).
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wrappings to include papers made for rolling tobacco.55 3 The General Assembly also amended Virginia Code section 18.2-371.2 to
prohibit the attempted purchase, as well as the completed purchase, of tobacco products by a minor. 54
E. ParentalNeglect Defense
Press reports nationwide and in Virginia have highlighted the
problem of newborn infants who are abandoned by their birth
mother. To offer an incentive for the mother to leave the child in a
safe place, the legislature created an affirmative defense to a
prosecution for child neglect for a parent who leaves a child no
55
older than fourteen days old with a hospital or rescue squad."
The affirmative defense only immunizes the act of abandoning
the infant, rather than any other abuse the child may have been
subjected to at the hands of that parent. 556
F. Indictments
The General Assembly amended Virginia Code section 18.2-111
to provide that proof of embezzlement is sufficient to sustain a
conviction for larceny. 5 7 This legislation nullifies the holding in
Bruhn v. Commonwealth,55 which held that the Commonwealth's
proof of embezzlement did not establish the charged offense of
larceny.5 59

553. Id. (codified as amended at VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-371.2(H) (Cum. Supp. 2003)).
554. Act of Mar. 16, 2003, ch. 114, 2003 Va. Acts (codified as amended at VA. CODE
ANN. § 18.2-371.2(B) (Cum. Supp. 2003)).
555. Act of Mar. 22, 2003, ch. 822, 2003 Va. Acts _ (codified as amended at VA. CODE
ANN. § 18.2-371 (Cum. Supp. 2003)).
556. VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-371.1 (Cure. Supp. 2003). For additional discussion of child
neglect and abuse issues in Virginia over the past year, see Shepherd, supra note 469, at
186-90.
557. Act of Mar. 19, 2003, ch. 733, 2003 Va. Acts (codified as amended at VA. CODE
ANN. § 18.2-111 (Cum. Supp. 2003)).
558. 37 Va. App. 537, 559 S.E.2d 880 (Ct. App. 2002).
559. Id. at 546-47, 559 S.E.2d at 885. For an extensive analysis of the Bruhn decision
and the General Assembly's reaction, see John G. Douglass, Annual Survey of Virginia
Law: Rethinking Theft Crimes in Virginia, 38 U. RICH. L. REV. 13 (2003).
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G. Resisting Arrest
The legislature fashioned a new offense of resisting arrest.
Under Virginia Code section 18.2-479.1, someone "who intentionally prevents or attempts to prevent a law-enforcement officer
from lawfully arresting him,... is guilty of a Class 1 misdemeanor." 6 ' The law defines "intentionally preventing or attempting to prevent a lawful arrest" as:
fleeing from a law-enforcement officer when (i) the officer applies physical force to the person, or (ii) the officer
communicates to the person that he is under arrest and
(a) the officer has the legal authority and the immediate
physical ability to place the person under arrest, and (b)
a reasonable person who receives such communication
knows or should know that he is not free to leave. 561
H. Sex Crimes
Extensive media coverage of the impending release of an individual convicted of violent sexual offenses prompted passage of
legislation permitting the civil commitment of "[s]exually violent
predators."5 62 The effective date of this previously enacted legislation was advanced from 2004 to effective from its passage.5 The
law targets prisoners who have been convicted of certain predicate violent sexual offenses. 6 4 The law defines a sexually violent
predator as a person with a qualifying offense who, "because of a
mental abnormality or personality disorder, finds it difficult to
control his predatory behavior."56 5 The individual must receive a
certain score on a sex offender risk assessment instrument. 66 The
Attorney General must file a petition and prove that the individ-

560. Act of Mar. 20, 2003, ch. 805, 2003 Va. Acts (codified at VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2479.1(A) (Cum. Supp. 2003)).
561. VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-479.1(B) (Cum. Supp. 2003).
562. Act of Apr. 2, 2003, ch. 989, 2003 Va. Acts (codified as amended at VA. CODE
ANN. §§ 37.1-70.1 to -70.6, and 37.1-70.9 to -70.16 (Cum. Supp. 2003)). Although civil, the
legislation implicates criminal convictions and is included here.
563. See id. (codified as amended at VA. CODE ANN. § 2.2-3703 (Cum. Supp. 2003); id.
§§ 37.1-70.1 to -70.6, 37.1-70.9 to -70.16, 37.1-103, 37.1-104, and 37.1-104.1 (Cum. Supp.
2003)).
564. Id.
565.

VA. CODE ANN. § 37.1-70.1 (Cum. Supp. 2003).

566.

Id. § 37.1-70.5(B) (Cum. Supp. 2003).
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ual is a sexual predator by "clear and convincing evidence." 6 7 The
law restricts the prisoner's ability to challenge his prior convictions.56 8 Either party can request a civil jury.56 9 The law restricts
access to discovery in such cases.5 70 Finally, the prisoner's right to
use evidence in his defense is curtailed if he refuses to cooperate
with a mental examination.5 7 '
In Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition,72 the Supreme Court of
the United States struck, on First Amendment grounds, portions
of a federal law prohibiting the possession of certain "virtual"
child pornography images-i.e. computer generated images that
appear to be children.5 73 In response, the General Assembly enacted a proposal by the Attorney General to create a registry of
images.5 74 The registry will assist law enforcement in determining
whether the child pornography images in the possession of a defendant are real or virtual.5 75
I. Statutory Double Jeopardy
The General Assembly amended Virginia Code section 19.2-294
to prevent re-prosecution for the "same act."5 76 The prior provision
precluded a prosecution in state court once a federal prosecution
had commenced, with "commenced" defined as "the return of an
indictment by a grand jury or the filing of an information."5 7 7
That provision was broadened to provide that a federal prosecution commences when jeopardy attaches.5 78

567. Id. § 37.1-70.11(C) (Cum. Supp. 2003).
568. Id. § 37.1-70.2 (Cum. Supp. 2003).
569. Id. § 37.1-70.9(B) (Cum. Supp. 2003).
570. Id. § 37.1-70.9(C) (Cum. Supp. 2003).
571. Id. § 37.1-70.2 (Cum. Supp. 2003).
572. 535 U.S. 234 (2002).
573. See id. at 258.
574. Act of Mar. 24, 2003, ch. 938, 2003 Va. Acts 390.3 (Cum. Supp. 2003)).
575.

576.
ANN. §
577.
578.
ANN. §

(codified at VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-

VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-390.3(B) (Cum. Supp. 2003).

Act of Mar. 19. 2003, ch. 736, 2003 Va. Acts
19.2-294 (Cum. Supp. 2003)).
VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-294 (Repl. Vol. 2000).
Act of Mar. 19, 2003, ch. 736, 2003 Va. Acts
19.2-294 (Cum. Supp. 2003)).

-

(codified as amended at VA. CODE

-

(codified as amended at VA. CODE
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J. Criminal Investigations/ GrandJuries
To combat the growing problem of money laundering, the General Assembly, at the request of the Attorney General, enacted a
provision requiring financial institutions or credit card issuers to
disclose certain records and information pursuant to the issuance
of a subpoena duces tecum.5 79 The legislation also allows financial
institutions to seek to quash or modify unduly burdensome subpoenas.518 The General Assembly expanded the power of a grand
jury to enable the grand jury to subpoena "tangible things." 8 '
Also, the number of grand jurors summoned to serve was expanded from seven to nine.5 82
IX. CONCLUSION
The past year witnessed extensive changes to an ever more
complex body of law. This richness and complexity presents both
daunting challenges and great rewards for the prepared practitioner. Consequently, a wise practitioner will always research
the law before trying a case.

579. Act of Mar. 16, 2003, ch. 223, 2003 Va. Acts _
10.1(A) (Cum. Supp. 2003)).
580. Id.
581. Act of Mar. 18, 2003, ch. 565, 2003 Va. Acts _
ANN. § 19.2-208 (Cum. Supp. 2003)).
582. Act of Mar. 22, 2003, ch. 825, 2003 Va. Acts ANN. § 19.2-194 (Cum. Supp. 2003)).
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